Everything the platform sees begins inside the meter.
We design the meter as well. A platform written by people who know what happens in the field — from the measuring cell to the signature, from the valve to the event log — behaves differently from one that receives data from a stranger.
What is inside the meter
- 1 Ultrasonic measuring cell No moving parts, and no mechanism that drifts as it wears.
- 2 Segment display Index, valve state and warning icons, readable by eye on site.
- 3 Optical service port Local reading, calibration and commissioning — authenticated.
- 4 NB-IoT module Cellular connectivity; several module types, one address.
- 5 Secure element The private key is created here and stays here; it never reaches the MCU.
- 6 Tamper sensors Top cover, battery cover and magnet — each recorded separately.
- 7 Safety valve Remote close and open; it never opens on its own.
- 8 Dual battery A deep-sleep architecture; the battery cover is part of tamper too.
What the meter does, in six headings.
Measurement
- Ultrasonic measurement — no moving parts
- Measured volume (Vm) and volume converted for temperature and pressure (Vb)
- G4–G40 nominal size; Qmin/Qmax range checking derived from the size
- The index keeps counting through over-range — the behaviour the standard asks for
Legal metrology
- Designed within MID MI-002, OIML R137, EN 14236 and EN 12405-1
- Metrology isolated in its own module; the host software does not measure
- WELMEC seal record and a legally-relevant change counter
- The legal forward index is monotonic — under no condition does it go backwards
Communication
- Cellular connectivity over NB-IoT
- Signed REST or DLMS/COSEM (IEC 62056)
- UNI/TS 11291 event and data objects
- Authenticated optical port, for the field and the laboratory
Security
- Secure element: the private key never reaches the microcontroller
- Every measurement packet is signed with ECDSA inside the meter
- Signed firmware and a verified boot chain
- Cover, battery cover and magnet tampering, plus an attempt counter
- Only an authorised operation clears a tamper record
Safety valve
- Remote open and close; the command is signed on the server and verified in the meter
- Automatic closure on over-flow and over-pressure (four modes, sealed setting)
- It never opens on its own decision — opening is always a human act
- Flow seen while the valve is closed raises a leak event
Logging and tariffs
- Three independent event logs: legal, parameter, general
- Load profile and period index records
- Time-of-use and block tariffs in one module
- Reverse flow accumulates in a register of its own
Reverse flow: the subscriber neither pays twice nor talks the bill down.
What a meter does when gas flows backwards is a fine question of accounting. Ours: the legal forward index never falls — it stops; the reverse volume accumulates in a separate register and is written to the event log. A legitimate reverse flow is therefore not mistaken for an anomaly, and a malicious one cannot wind the bill back.
The platform is not tied to one piece of hardware. A manufacturer-independent adapter layer lets meters from other makers connect, each showing as much as it supports. The list here describes what our own meter can do — and what the platform was written to be able to handle.
See the meter and the platform together.
The whole chain, from the meter's optical port to the work order in the console, on one platform; connecting your company systems is on the integration page.